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ABSTRACT
This article analyses European integration’s effects on migration and
border security governance in Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia in
the context of ‘governed interdependence’. We show how
transgovernmental networks comprising national and EU actors,
plus a range of other participants, blur the distinction between
the domestic and international to enable interactions between
domestic and international policy elites that transmit EU priorities
into national policy. Governments are shown to be ‘willing pupils’
and ‘policy takers’, adapting to EU policy as a pre-condition for
membership. This strengthened rather than weakened central
state actors, particularly interior ministries. Thus, in a
quintessentially ‘national’ policy area, there has been a re-scaling
and re-constitution of migration and border security policy. To
support this analysis, social network analysis is used to outline the
composition of governance networks and analyse interactions and
power relations therein.
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Introduction
This article develops a comparative analysis for three South East European (SEE)
countries (Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia) of the effects of European integration
on migration and border security governance. It explores the consequences of EU
requirements in these policies on the core executive in the case countries and the
effects of ‘governed interdependence’ (Weiss 1998) in a region where the EU and Euro-
pean integration are central to debates about migration and border security, debates
that have become focused on the EU’s external frontiers and on new and prospective
member states. Social network analysis (SNA) is used to specify the content of ‘trans-
governmental networks’, comprising national and EU ofﬁcials, plus a range of other
actors, such as international organisations, that transmit EU priorities to prospective
member states (Slaughter 2009).
The idea of governed interdependence is a particularly useful way of thinking about the
issues of migration management and border security because it counters the ‘myth of the
powerless state’ (Weiss 1998) and directs attention towards the reconstitution of state
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authority and the EU’s role in this reconstitution, or as Weiss (1998, 3) puts it: ‘the adap-
tability of states, their differential capacity, and the enhanced importance of state power in
the new international environment’. We show how, under conditions of governed inter-
dependence, each of our cases has been a ‘policy taker’ required to adapt to EU policy
as a pre-condition for access to the wider beneﬁts of membership. This has strengthened
rather than weakened central state actors, notably interior ministries. We explore the re-
scaling and re-constitution of migration and border security policy and what this means
for the dynamics of policy in SEE and for the networks of transgovernmental action
characteristic of this policy ﬁeld.
In order to specify the conceptual and empirical dimensions of state adaptation to
European integration, the paper explores the network basis of governed interdependence.
SNA puts ﬂesh on the bones of the network metaphor by showing the composition and
relational aspects of these governance networks. When studying networks, we refer to
attempts to represent interactions (number, scope and intensity) between ministers, ofﬁ-
cials from national, regional and international organisations. At the least, such interactions
represent a change in the strategic context of decision-making on migration, but, drawing
from interview material, we also show that they can prompt new, shared understandings
of challenges of ‘Europeanised’ migration governance. The notion of transgovernmental-
ism is helpful because it cuts through a stale intergovernmental versus supranational
dichotomy in EU studies and, instead, focuses attention on how forms of co-operation
and interaction lead to speciﬁc forms of exchange, such as the sharing of information,
knowledge and experiences between ofﬁcials and a wide range of organisations including
member states, but also other actors such as international organisations (Keohane and Nye
1977).
To develop its argument, the article ﬁrst explores the debate on inter-state co-operation
on migration to show that accounts that focus only on the more instrumental motives for
co-operation can miss the social dynamics that occur as a result of regular interactions. We
do so by exploring the debate about the EU’s ‘transformative’ effects on new and prospec-
tive member states (Börzel and Risse 2012). The article then develops its empirical analysis
by analysing the dynamics of co-operation in the three case countries to demonstrate the
conditions under which inter-state co-operation occurs in the shadow of ‘fortress Europe’
and its effects, particularly on the executive branch of government. The time period for the
analysis is 2008–2010 selected in order to test differing exposure to the EU migration
acquis: Slovenia joined the EU in 2004; Croatia was in the process of joining the EU
and under intense adaptational pressure (it joined in summer 2013); and, Macedonia
was (and still is) negotiating membership. None is a major migrant destination country,
but all developed new migration laws and administrative structures as a consequence of
their relationship with the EU (Taylor, Geddes, and Lees 2012, Chapter 5). Our focus is
on migration and border security policy that concern rules governing the entry and resi-
dence of third country nationals (TCNs). Border security policy focuses on the develop-
ment of controls and checks at land-, air- and seaports to regulate access to a state’s
territory to those with the appropriate permission to enter. For reasons of space and
because of the complexity of the issues, we do not assess the asylum issue, but do recognise
the important connections between migration and asylum; not least that efforts to enhance
border security can make it more difﬁcult for asylum-seekers to access the asylum process
in EU member states.
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Governing migration in SEE
This section explores the relationship between migration, governance and ‘state capacity’
in the context of governed interdependence in Europe. These are key issues for the EU in
terms of both its internal governance, where EU laws on aspects of migration create a rule-
bound context with an emergent common EU migration and asylum policy (covering
some but not all aspects of policy), and the EU’s external relations with prospective
member states and non-member states that lie beyond the remit of EU laws and have a
more intergovernmental character (Lavenex 2006; Boswell and Geddes 2011). Each of
the three countries analysed is more notable as a country of emigration rather than immi-
gration but there are also important legacies of movement (both voluntary and involun-
tary) within the ex-Yugoslav federation and as a result of the displacement arising from the
conﬂicts of the 1990s. As already noted, none of the three case countries are major desti-
nation countries. In 2008, 3.3% of the population of Slovenia were TCNs, compared to
1.5% in Croatia and 0.7% in Macedonia. Migration had a strong intra-regional dimension.
For example, in Slovenia in 2008, 47.3% of TCNs were from Bosnia–Herzegovina with
20.1%, 10.9% and 10.2% from Serbia, Macedonia and Croatia, respectively (Eurostat
2009).
Despite these very particular migration dynamics with a strong intra-regional dimen-
sion, the focus of this article is on the ways in which the EU seeks to re-constitute
migration as a challenge of governance (Trauner 2011, 17–33). We understand governance
to possess a ‘dual meaning’ as an empirical manifestation of state adaptation and the con-
ceptual representation of social systems with the core purposes of governance being the
provision of safety, prosperity, coherence, stability and continuation (Pierre 2000, 3).
These purposes are not necessarily connected with a particular form or location of govern-
mental authority and may be pursued by national governments or by a range of public and
private institutions and organisations at sub-national, national and international levels.
Their pursuit may become tied to particular understandings of ‘good governance’,
which also means that the analysis of governance is not merely a technical exercise
because of its implications for the distribution of power.
While international migration is often represented as a challenge (or threat) to govern-
ance, we argue that it is more appropriate to think of it as a challenge of governance
because international migration is constituted and conditioned by the borders and bound-
aries of states (Zolberg 1989). The governance of migration in SEE thus cuts across what
Rosenau (1997) termed the ‘domestic-foreign Frontier’ and is also reﬂective of what
Heisler (1992) identiﬁed as a key feature of international migration as an issue in inter-
national politics; namely that it is simultaneously a societal and an international issue
and needs to be analysed across these levels.
The notion of the network has become a powerful metaphor within analyses of govern-
ance. We aim to develop this metaphor by specifying more precisely through the use of
SNA the composition of governance networks and power relations therein. This requires
some explanation of this methodological choice and its theoretical implications. SNA
permits systematic analysis and ‘thicker’ description of networks and why they are as
they are. This article draws from 35 detailed semi-structured interviews in the case
countries and at the EU level. Additionally within these interviews, a structured question-
naire asked respondents to identify the organisations with which they interacted and to
JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 3
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estimate the frequency and intensity of interaction.1 Our unit of analysis is not the actor
but interaction between actors within the network. The data from the semi-structured
component of the interview allowed us to explore ‘situated agency’ with recognition
that agency is situated ‘within a social context that inﬂuences it’ (Bevir and Rhodes
2003, 4). Power and inﬂuence ﬂow from network relationships, which are the product
of engagement with the EU.
Barnett and Duvall’s (2005) relational conceptualisation of power in global governance
informs our approach. Power relations can involve a compulsory component that is
without doubt an important dynamic for countries required to adapt to the EU acquis
as a condition for membership. We also ﬁnd evidence of institutional power as EU inﬂu-
ence shapes domestic institutional formation in the three countries. Structural forms of
power are evidenced by the diffusion of ideas about migration located within EU
migration management. Finally, the more productive or discursive aspects of the relational
view of power developed by Barnett and Duvall are evident in the social and communica-
tive logics associated with the transgovernmental networks in the ﬁeld of migration and
border security. To sum up, the beliefs and actions of individuals within these networks
are not independent; rather they are located within the social and political contexts of
network relations that are the product of EU rules and preferences interacting with the
national context.
As will be seen, the three ‘domestic’ migration and border security networks have a
transnational orientation and ‘interlock’ in response to speciﬁc EU policy requirements.
The focus for SNA is the causes and consequences of the connections among a system’s
elements. Our analysis was particularly interested in the ways in which position in the
network affects both the deﬁnition and control of the policy agenda. The SNA, sup-
plemented by material from the semi-structured interviews, allowed us to explore in
more detail the relational aspects of the networks, that is, not only to map the nodes
and identify relationships, but also to explore the nature of these relationships. This
allows us to go beyond the notion of network as an organisational mode by assessing
the relational characteristics of networks insofar as they affect the determination of
policy agendas (Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery 2009). We thus understand net-
works as lying between states with their hierarchical character and markets that centre on
a ‘more ephemeral bargaining relationship’ and see them as ‘sets of relations that form
structures, which in turn may constrain or enable agents’ (Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and
Montgomery 2009, 559–560).
There is insufﬁcient space to recount in detail developments at the EU level or region-
ally in the area of migration and border security (see, e.g. Geddes 2008; Boswell and
Geddes 2011 and on SEE, see Taylor, Geddes, and Lees 2013), but it is important to
note that in the area of border security prospective, member states must demonstrate
their capacity to conform to the provisions of the Schengen Borders Code (SBC),
Article 6 of which speciﬁes the mechanisms through which states are expected to regulate
access to their territory: possession of a valid identity card; a valid visa (if required); jus-
tiﬁcation of the purposes of the stay; means of subsistence for stay, onward travel or
return; no alert on the Schengen Information System; and no threat to public order,
health or safety. It is the capacity of a state to adapt to, and implement, these requirements
that is an essential component of EU membership. Slovenia adapted to this acquis prior to
its membership in 2004, Croatian accession was predicated upon adaptation, while
4 A. GEDDES AND A. TAYLOR
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Macedonian membership will depend on adaptation demonstrating the state’s capacity to
regulate territorial access. Visa liberalisation has also been a carrot dangled in front of pro-
spective member states. Both Croatia and Macedonia beneﬁted from such an arrangement
that serves as a practical manifestation of the movement towards the EU migration and
border security framework.
The key intended EU impact on newmember states relates to the issue of state capacity.
In the simplest of terms, capacity is the ability to attain objectives. Geddes and Taylor
(2013) distinguish between three dimensions of state capacity: a functional dimension
adds an EU dimension to domestic policy debate that can provide external impetus to
internal policy change; a political dimension means the development of ‘better’ policy
in the context, for example, of securing the wider objective of EU membership; and,
ﬁnally, an administrative dimension allows for the inclusion of national ofﬁcials within
new regional and international governance networks. Each of these three dimensions
can strengthen domestic capacity, although each is predicated upon a particular under-
standing of the policy issues and appropriate responses. In the case of migration and
border security, there is a clear control-driven agenda that emanates from the EU Com-
mission and member states that derives from the perception of SEE as the EU’s ‘soft
underbelly’ exposed to ﬂows of irregular migrants (Figure 1). This issue ‘framing’ then
structures a speciﬁc ‘capacity bargain’ linking ministers and ofﬁcials in each of the three
case countries to the transgovernmental networks that have developed on migration in
the European Union and in SEE.
For EU membership to be secured, it is essential that aspiring member states demon-
strate the capacity to regulate access to their territory, that is, they need to demonstrate
their capacity to act as a sovereign state prior to ceding aspects of this authority to the
EU. An immediate puzzle is why EU policy has now extended into areas of migration
and border security that are ‘high politics’ in that they closely relate to state sovereignty.
Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik (2009) advance a liberal institutionalist account of
inter-state co-operation to argue that co-operation can enhance the quality of national
democratic processes by weakening special interests and factions, offering scope for the
protection of individual rights, improving the quality of democratic deliberation and,
most importantly in the context of the analysis contained within this article, increasing
a state’s capacity to attain policy objectives. But why would states cede autonomy in an
area that is so closely linked to their sovereign authority? Writing in the 1960s, Hoffmann
(1966) argued that European integration would be likely to founder in the face of inte-
gration’s movement into areas of high politics that are closely linked to state sovereignty.
In similar vein, Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik (2009) argue that multilateral co-oper-
ation is unlikely on issues such as immigration because it is an issue of ‘high politics’ with
the potential for high levels of domestic political conﬂict (analogous to issues such as
welfare and taxation). Notwithstanding, we do see a common migration and asylum
policy at the EU level that may not provide a full and comprehensive framework for
EU migration, but which is a signiﬁcant challenge to the view that European integration
would not extend to issues of high politics. This theoretical puzzle points to limits of liberal
institutionalist accounts and the advantages of a focus on transgovernmental networks
that create scope for social and communicative logics of institutional behaviour to sup-
plement the narrower focus on rational, instrumental logics.
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Transgovernmental networks create scope for regularised interaction by a range of
actors, including, for instance, national ofﬁcials, but also other actors such as international
and supranational organisations, academics, private sector organisations, think tanks and
NGOs. These interactions centre on the sharing and exchange of practice, which can be
understood as socially recognised competence (Adler and Pouliot 2011; Bicchi 2011).
Transgovernmental networks provide a setting for the social validation of competence
enabled by the regularised interaction and exchange via the networks that are identiﬁed
later in this article. It could be that these transgovernmental networks lack substance
and merely change the strategic context within which interactions occur without really
affecting the identities and preferences of actors. This would correspond with a ‘thin’,
Figure 1. Annual detections at the Greek–Turkish border and En Route from Greece to other EU
member states. Source: Western Balkans Annual Risk Analysis 2012, 18.
6 A. GEDDES AND A. TAYLOR
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instrumental logic of institutional behaviour more in accordance with the rationalist pre-
cepts of liberal institutionalism. However, this article’s analysis of the composition of net-
works suggest that they play a role in developing new forms of interaction that affect the
interests and identities of participants and prompt institutional logics of appropriateness
that are more social in content. The identiﬁcation of the scope for social and communi-
cative logics to supplement instrumental logics is developed by Börzel and Risse (2012)
in their assessment of the EU’s transformative effects in which they suggest an important
role in constituting the identities and preferences of actors arising are regular interactions
with peers, as well communicative logics arising from encounters with differing
approaches and the need to justify these to its various components.
These logics of institutional behaviour occur within a policy area in which there has
been a ‘multi-levelling’ of policy and legal responses to international migration, but
within which transgovernmental networks link our three case countries with neighbouring
states, EU member states, EU institutions and agencies and with a range of international
organisations. It is this setting that provides the context within which ideas and action
develop in the area of migration and border security. In turn, this relates to the point
made earlier about control of the policy agenda within these networks. Our SNA and
interview data demonstrate that while the EU may not always be strongly present as a
network actor, it is strongly present as the frame of reference for policy development
and interaction. For example, the European Commission is responsible for the manage-
ment of policy and oversight of its implementation. The EU’s ideas are the dominant
ideas governing migration and border security in SEE. While the focus of policy
remains very much centred on interior ministries in each case country, there is also exten-
sive involvement by, and with, sub-national, national, sub-regional, regional and inter-
national organisations and agencies. For example, the sub-regional setting in SEE is
evident though the MARRI (Migration, Asylum and Refugees Regional Initiative)
project on migration, asylum and refugees that brings together six SEE countries
(Albania, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) that were
during the period of this analysis (2008–2010) non-EU member states, and which
sought to facilitate co-operation on issues closely related to the EU migration and
border security acquis and the development of associated capacity.
Multi-levelling is also apparent through the pursuit of ‘Integrated Border Management’
(IBM). IBM is centred on the promotion of multi-level governance in the pursuit of
reinforced domestic capacity. The intention is that this will arise from: intra-service co-
operation within organisations and agencies; intra-agency co-operation between different
ministries and agencies involved in this ﬁeld; and international co-operation with agencies
and ministries of other states and with international organisations. Other EU member
states can shape policy in prospective member states through ‘twinning’ exercises, while
international organisations such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM)
and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) provide
migration management services. Even within a relatively small country such as Macedo-
nia, IBM poses signiﬁcant challenges. As one interviewee noted:
One of the main problems is how to improve the level of co-ordination and co-operation
between domestic institutions especially in IBM where you have a variety of institutions,
JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 7
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agencies which is quite vast and covers about 6–7 ministries and a dozen of agencies [sic]
which all have to be integrated into the system. (Interview, September 2008)
At the start of this section, we asked why states would cede sovereignty and, why
speciﬁcally, the three case countries have done so. The answer to the ﬁrst question is
that, EU action tends to focus on challenges seen as arising from governed interdepen-
dence, but co-operation not only changes the strategic context within which interaction
occurs but also creates scope for the development of transgovernmental networks that
provide a forum for the exchange of ideas and practices that depend upon the social rec-
ognition of competence. EU action thus seeks to strengthen state capacity and resolve an
issue—the perceived and not necessarily real challenge of potential large-scale through
SEE—that is then seen to constitute a collective problem for EU member states. At the
more speciﬁc level of the three case countries, the potential beneﬁts of EU membership
across a wide range of policy issues are tied to acceptance of the EU acquis in the area
of migration and border security. Each of the three case countries had to accept the
migration and border security acquis if they were to join the EU. They were required to
‘learn’, but were not unwilling pupils. The analysis then moves to an assessment of the
relational consequences of these developments and on the ways in which domestic govern-
ance systems in the area of migration and border security in each of our three case
countries has been reconﬁgured and reconstituted as a result of European integration.
We show how actors within the core executive of each case country saw their role and
network centrality reinforced as a result of European integration, but our data also
show how their roles changed as a result of new kinds of interaction and exposure to
policy ideas and practices emanating from the EU and its member states.
Migration and border security in SEE
Yugoslavia’s collapse and the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007 were seen to create a ‘ter-
ritorial hole’ through which ran what was called a ‘Western Balkan’ migration route
(Marenin 2010, 13) that was, according to the EU border agency Frontex: ‘largely a func-
tion of the transiting ﬂow of migrants that enter the EU at the Greek-Turkish borders and
later continue towards other Member States’ (Frontex 2012, 20). This route has also been
closely associated with the so-called Pan-European Transport Corridor X (Salzburg-Thes-
saloniki) that crosses Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Greece.
Frontex identiﬁed three migration ﬂows affecting the case countries that were particu-
larly relevant to the time period for our study (2008–2010): ﬁrst and largest was ‘circular’
migration of Albanians into Greece; second, migrants from south Asia, the Middle East
and Africa; third, Turkish nationals entering Greece with the intention of onwards move-
ment in the EU. This second ﬂow was seen to represent ‘an increasingly growing threat to
the integrity of the borders in the Western Balkan region and internal security/migration
policies in the EU’ (Frontex 2010, 18). Frontex also reported that migrants transiting
through Greece preferred the fastest route into Schengen, meaning Slovenia (Croatia
did not immediately become part of Schengen on accession in 2013). The Western
Balkan/Corridor X route was, therefore, identiﬁed as a key issue for the EU with important
framing effects on migration and border security in each of the three case countries. The
resultant policy setting is complex, involving at least ﬁve states and embracing border
8 A. GEDDES AND A. TAYLOR
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management, asylum and return policies. The migration routes themselves were seen as
attractive to migrants because they were accessible and relatively low cost while ‘transit’
required ‘simple’ smuggling services with a low probability of being caught and opportu-
nities for multiple attempts. This all points to the centrality of national and cross-border
capacity and coordination but:
as long as illegal entry to the EU in Greece is perceived as relatively easy… new migrants will
continue to arrive from Turkey. A substantial proportion is likely to use the Western Balkan
land route should the mitigation measures there remain unchanged. (Frontex 2012, 39)
Thus has proven a well-founded assumption in the aftermath of the conﬂict in Syria
psot-2012, albeit outside the time period for this analysis.
Frontex has no executive powers but plays a key role in promoting interoperability,
involving permanent co-operation on technology, doctrine, organisational cultures,
trust-building and the speciﬁcation of standards. Frontex led the development of a
Western Balkans Risk Analysis Network to provide technical training on data exchange
to ‘risk analysis units’. It also established Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT).
Interventions that seek to reinforce border security can have unintended effects. Schengen
visa standards, for example, mean that people who could once cross freely from non-EU
states require visas and face the prospect of being:
driven back into an inner ghetto space. This applies of course only to law-abiding citizens,
since criminals can walk or bribe their way across these frontiers with little difﬁculty. The
introduction of visa requirements is a stimulus for corruption and criminality, since the
borders are unenforceable, and the attempts to install them create incentives for illegal
activity, including the trafﬁcking of goods and people. (Marenin 2010, 37)
Slovenia
Slovenia’s geographical location and external border with Croatia made it a terminus of
the Western Balkan route and central to the EU’s IBM policy and thus to the transgovern-
mental migration governance networks. From the 1950s, there was emigration from Slo-
venia by ‘guest workers’, particularly to Austria and Germany, and movement within the
Yugoslav federation. From the mid-1970s Bosnians, Croats and Serbs moved to Slovenia
leading to a ‘turbulent period in the history of migration to Slovenia, above all because of
the break-up of the former Yugoslavia’ (Thomson 2006, 2). Independence in 1991
deprived tens of thousands of migrants from other Yugoslav Republics of their legal
status in Slovenia. The Slovenia–Croatia border was the focus for Frontex Operations
KRAS and DRIVE-IN in 2007 in response to irregular migration. Slovenia was the location
of the ﬁrst RABIT exercise in 2008 whose scenario was a sudden massive inﬂux of illegal
immigrants using theWestern Balkan route. Border guards from 20 EU states participated
in an exercise to test the reinforcement of a Member State’s response capacity (House of
Lords 2008; Vaughan-Williams 2008; Neal 2009). By 2011, Frontex was reporting a 108%
increase in the number of Slovenian nationals facilitating illegal border crossing and there
has been a tendency for migrants to shift from Hungary to Slovenia (Frontex 2011, 15).
Engagement with FRONTEX enabled Slovenia to participate in a regional political
setting, engage with non-EU neighbours and work with international organisations.
This sub-regional dimension to the governance of border security and migration within
JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 9
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
oy
al 
Ha
lla
ms
hir
e H
os
pit
al]
 at
 04
:18
 23
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
16
 
SEE was important in all our cases and was framed by EU inﬂuences, national concerns
and the interests of international organisations in developing policy and capacity.
Slovenia made a rapid adaptation to the requirements of EU membership and to the
Europeanised frame for the governance of migration and border security. Between 1992
and 1998, large numbers of refugees moved to Slovenia from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Employment and Work of Aliens Act (1992) responded to the labour market conse-
quences of independence and the presence of large numbers of (now) ex-Yugoslavs by
allowing long-term (at least 10 years) resident foreign nationals to acquire a work
permit. In 2000, legislation was amended in line with EU legislation to create three
types of work permit: for long-term residents; for employers to bring in workers; and
for temporary migrant workers. Between 1999 and 2004, there were relatively high
levels of irregular migration and in the third period (after May 2004) policy was framed
by the EU and reﬂected core EU priorities, particularly the focus on border security
and the ‘external’ dimension of the EU’s ‘ﬁght against illegal immigration’ (Adams and
Devillard 2009, 418). The legislative framework during our ﬁeldwork was the Aliens Act
(2006) and two resolutions on immigration policy passed by the National Assembly, Res-
olution 40/1999 and 106/2002 regulated the entry of foreigners and the return of emi-
grants. The EU was concerned primarily with the Slovenia–Croatia border as an entry
point into the EU.
After Slovenia joined the EU in May 2004 its immigration legislation developed in
accordance with the EU acquis and Slovenia managed a swift and relatively trouble-free
adaptation (Adam and Devillard 2008, 425). The peak period for direct EU inﬂuence
was between 1998 when negotiations began) and Slovenia’s accession in 2004 after
which Slovenia’s roles as a policy taker widened into being a policy-maker with movement
from institutional creation to institutional evolution. Our SNA analysis (Figure 2) found
direct EU inﬂuence on Slovenian policy was nonetheless limited in the sense of visible par-
ticipation of EU institutions within the policy network. What is noticeable about
Figure 2. The migration and border security network: Slovenia. MI, Ministry of Interior; MCult, Ministry
of Culture; MLab, Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Affairs; MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; LGov,
Municipalities; UNHCR; IOM; IntNGOs, International NGOs; SPhil, Slovene Philanthropy; PInst, Peace
Institute; Unis, Universities and research institutions; LIC, Legal Informative Centre; EOO, Equal Oppor-
tunity Ofﬁce.
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Slovenia’s network is the important role played by NGOs and INGOs and the interior
ministry’s myriad connections within the network, which suggests a decline in EU inﬂu-
ence after accession over time. We would, however, distinguish between direct inﬂuence
and a profound impact on framing and the setting within which policy-makers operate.
The Ministry of the Interior was, unsurprisingly, the key actor within the network with
an extensive range of relations throughout the network. At the time of our research, the
Ministry of the Interior had three counsellors based in Brussels and was a participant
in the EU’s Strategic Committee on Immigration Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA) and its
working groups. As migration increased in scale, attention shifted to labour migration,
an area where the EU has no direct involvement, which drew other ministries, particularly
the Ministry of Labour, into the network. A quota system for labour migrants was insti-
tuted in 2004 to protect the domestic labour market after access but was little used. The
inevitable conclusion, ‘Slovenia is not at as attractive for economic migrants’ (Interview,
Ministry of Labour, June 2008) shifted the focus to border security. The Ministry of the
Interior focused on security but there was a more rights-based approach in the Ministry
of Labour, Family and Social Affairs (MLFSA).
Slovenia slotted quickly into the EU frame for migration management. This, however,
attracted some criticisms from civil society organisations. Despite rapid adaptation to a
common policy, that policy can be ‘used’ by different ministries for different purposes.
A Slovenian NGO ofﬁcial explained: ‘EU policy is welcomed by the Ministry of the
Interior… EU policy has measures regarding integration… but in practice more effort
is put into restrictive provisions such as border controls’ (Interview, June 21, 2008). A
second interviewee argued ‘EU policy is used as an excuse not to think about migration
—for copying EU directives into Slovene legislation without thinking about what
adopted legislation would really bring’ (Interview, Slovenian NGO, June 2008).
NGOs were often critical of the direction of policy after accession as policy shifted to
border security. Enhanced border security can, but not necessarily does, reduce a state’s
commitment to international, including, EU standards. A common theme in NGO inter-
views was that policy-making had regressed into an uncritical adoption of EU policy and a
watering down of protection standards (see also Toplak 2006). There was little contesta-
tion of EU policy at the elite level. The EU was seen as ‘the only game in town’ and mem-
bership was/is a key priority for each case country. As in all cases, however, the capacity
bargain applied to the formal dimension of policy in terms, for example, of legislative
adaptation. Geddes and Taylor (2013) argue that the capacity bargain focuses on the regu-
lation of territorial access, which poses a series of regulatory-type dilemmas, but has less to
say about the issues that arise once migrants are on a state’s territory, which relate to ques-
tions such as labour market access and social rights, both of which raise complex distri-
butive issues with domestic political consequences.
Croatia
Croatia has the longest external border in the EU: 1377 km compared to Greece’s 1248
km. Border issues were, therefore, of huge signiﬁcance in the accession process. The
Chapter 24 Screening Report in 2006 found a ‘substantial amount’ of work was required
if border management and enforcement capacity was to be improved; on migration
(‘limited degree in [sic] compliance’) legislation required ‘comprehensive’ amendment;
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asylum rights were guaranteed but ‘substantial improvements’ were needed here and in
visa policy. In all cases, major investments in capacity were required (CEC 2006a, 14–15).
Croatia’s external borders have been seen as posing a major challenge (Figure 3) with
the USA on the fringes of the network and extensive engagement with EU members such
as the UK, Netherlands and France. IBM was seen to require the ‘enhancing [of] inter-
agency capacities, legislative alignment and institution building’ on a major scale. Acces-
sion and, ultimately, joining the Schengen area demanded demonstrating clear progress on
‘legislative alignment, institutional adaptation, upgrading of staff, effective enforcement
and infrastructure investments’ over an extended period (CEC 2006b, 16–17). In 2009,
the Croatian authorities, pointing to growing effectiveness, detected 57% of irregular
border crossings at the Slovenia–Croatia border. Legislation such as the Aliens Act
(2011) and implementation of the asylum acquis depended on improved capacities,
both inter-agency and cross-border. The 2011 IBM plan was delayed by procurement
and technical problems but cooperation with Frontex, twinning, and close cooperation
with neighbours pointed to continued alignment with the EU and the evolution of the
capacity bargain (CEC 2012, 8). This led to the dominance of the interior ministry.
This was criticised by a foreign ministry ofﬁcial who argued this was ‘a big mistake
because migration policy as they perceive it is a policy of repression’ (Interview, December
20, 2007).
In Croatia, we found a very strong focus on rapid adaptation to the EU acquis. Nego-
tiations were opened on Chapter 24 on 24 October 2009. Changes were, therefore, a direct
result of engagement with the EU. A senior Ministry of the Interior ofﬁcial believed the EU
Figure 3. The migration and border security network: Croatia. MI, Ministry of the Interior; MJ, Ministry
of Justice; MHSW, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare; MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European
Integration; MEdu, Ministry of Science, Education and Sports; MEc, Ministry of Economy, Labour and
Entrepreneurship; CBCS, Cross-Border Co-operation Service; OHR, Ofﬁce of Human Rights; IIR, Institute
for International Relations, Zagreb; CLC, Croatian Legal Centre; IME, Institute for Migration and Ethni-
city; CPS, Centre for Peace Studies; CRC, Croatian Red Cross; DelCEC, European Commission; OSCE,
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe; IOM, International Organization for Migration;
UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; UNDP, United Nations Development Pro-
gramme; ICMPD, International Centre for Migration Policy Development; ECRE, European Council for
Refugees and Exiles; DCR, Dutch Council for Refugees.
12 A. GEDDES AND A. TAYLOR
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
oy
al 
Ha
lla
ms
hir
e H
os
pit
al]
 at
 04
:18
 23
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
16
 
‘has brought in changes that Croatia would have to bring in anyway [but] has quickened
the adoption and enforcement of legislation’ (Interview, Ministry of the Interior, April
2008). The EU’s primary effect was, then, to accelerate inevitable policy change. A
second senior civil servant reiterated this: ‘The question is whether Croatia could regulate
its society by itself. Of course it could, however this process is quickened and timeframes as
well as goals are set that oblige us to act’ (Interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Euro-
pean Integration, April 16, 2008).
Institutional creation was dominated by EU requirements including IBM and the
‘ﬁght against illegal immigration’ with measures to tackle people smuggling and human
trafﬁcking. The Act on the Amendments to the State Border Protection Act (December
2008) and the Act on the Amendments to the Aliens Act (March 2009) aligned Croatia
with both the EU acquis and SBC. The political lead on accession negotiations was
taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration and border and
migration issues were key as they were understood an indicative of Croatia’s ‘state-ness’
and capability (Interview, December 20, 2007). There was high-level co-ordination of
the accession process with weekly meetings facilitating a rapid response to issues.
Actors in day-to-day roles reported a strongly hierarchical administrative culture within
the Croatian core executive that produced delay as issues ﬁltered up to the senior level
and then ﬁltered back down.
Figure 3 shows engagement with the EU created scope for intervention by inter-
national organisations (such as UNHCR, IOM and ICMPD) offering technical knowl-
edge and expertise. For example, from 2002 the UNHCR and IOM organised seminars
on the role of border guards; developmental work included DCAF’s work on the demi-
litarisation of borders and civilian control. The ICMPD drew on EU funding through its
‘AENEAS’ budget-line to develop aMemorandum of Understanding between countries in
the region established statistical information exchange on illegal migration and the par-
ticipation in a regional early warning system (November 2008). The EC delegation lacked
the staff and expertise to undertake detailed technical policy work and training and
focused on management and monitoring and encouraging cooperation between the
Croatian government and international organisations. There was, however, an awareness
of the limits of policy transfer and here the Commission delegation played an important
role:
If there is some kind of resistance at the Ministry, or things are working slowly, then we come
in. We nail them down. You are never going to be able to credibly argue that this chapter can
be closed unless you have done this and these changes in, let’s say, border law. (Interview,
European Commission Delegation, April 2009)
Twinning was provided under CARDS, PHARE and TAIEX and involved, for example,
the Netherlands, Austria, Slovenia, Germany and Hungary. For example, the Austrian
government was the twinning partner for IBM and there was active co-operation with
Frontex. A Working Agreement for the Establishment of Operational Cooperation
between Frontex and the Ministry of the Interior was signed on 15 April 2008 that pro-
vided for cooperation in the exchange of information, education, joint operations, techni-
cal cooperation and risk analysis. Croatia also participated in a range of Frontex
operations. In 2008 and 2009, these included the Europol/Frontex ‘Task Force’ for
improvement of border management and the combating of organised crime; joint
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operations DRIVE IN, KRAS (2008) and NEPTUNE (2009); and participation in the
FRAN Unit (Risk analyses).
International organisations deliver expertise but did not participate actively in policy-
making. One reason for this was that laws (framed by the requirements of the EU acquis)
needed to be developed rapidly. An IOM ofﬁcial reported that the 2008 legislation was
developed very hurriedly and that the Parliamentary committee dealing with the legis-
lation called on IOM for its views at one day’s notice (Interview, IOM Ofﬁcial, April
2008). This also reﬂects some reluctance to draw from expert knowledge, which can be
attributed in part to more critical or reﬂective elements that could slow adaptation to
the EU. A Ministry of the Interior ofﬁcial argued that experts ‘have been included in
the drafting of migration policy in the working group, but their input has not been as
we expected. Very often they appear as criticisers, but not as those who recommend sol-
utions’ (Interview, Ministry of the Interior, April 2008). Specialists believed their exclusion
was due to the emphasis on rapid adaptation: ‘policy-makers do not gain knowledge from
domestic sources… but they learn what they are forced to’ (Interview, Migration Research
Institute, April 2008).
The core executive in Croatia appeared as relatively secretive and centralised. So, for
example, the role of external advisers was limited ‘since Croatia received legal acts from
Brussels that have to be implemented and those are usual technical issues… Experts
know very little… ’ (Interview, Ministry of the Interior, April 16, 2008). Experts were
judged by the interior ministry, to be obstacles to adaptation: ‘Very Often they appear
as criticisers… not as those who recommend solutions’ (Interview, April 16, 2008).
The Commission, however, took a positive view on development of IBM believing
Croatia ‘developed a pretty good integrated border management strategy and action
plan on the basis of western Balkans guidelines’ (Interview, Commission Ofﬁcial, April
2008). The focus was securing Croatia’s borders to demonstrate its capacity as a sovereign
state and the image of a ‘good neighbour’.
Macedonia
Macedonia was at the time of this study (and still is) a country of emigration not immi-
gration. In 2010, 29.1% of its tertiary educated population lived abroad (World Bank
2011). There was a very strong domestic awareness of the importance attached to
border control by the EU, reinforced by Macedonia’s geographical location that made it
the ‘funnel’ of the Western Balkan route. Effective border control along EU lines was
also seen as demonstrating Macedonia’s legitimacy and effectiveness as a state. A failure
to act, then, would undoubtedly damage seriously Macedonia’s relations with the EU.
In 2011 and indicative of its incorporation within transgovernmental networks and
within an Europeanised frame for migration management, Macedonia participated for
the ﬁrst time in Frontex operational activities. This involved participation in a perma-
nent Frontex operation focused on the eastern and southern land borders of EU
member states and the Neptune joint operation focused on land borders in the
Western Balkans (Frontex 2011). As with the other cases, we found determined attempts
to adapt to the EU framework for the governance of migration and border security
driven by the pressures and demands of enlargement. Efforts were largely centred on
the Interior Ministry with little evidence of elite-level contestation of the policy
14 A. GEDDES AND A. TAYLOR
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
oy
al 
Ha
lla
ms
hir
e H
os
pit
al]
 at
 04
:18
 23
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
16
 
frame. EU priorities were thus ‘imported’ into the domestic context as part of the wider
context of adaptation to the requirements of EU membership. Civil servants sometimes
expressed puzzlement over the absence of deﬁnitive understandings of what was to be
done. For example,
If you talk to a French police ofﬁcer, from the French border police, he has one experience…
While the German police ofﬁcer will say something else, the Swedish one will say something
completely different. I think that [this] can sometimes create a problem for us… It is not so
easy when you will have to put all that together in one single frame. (Interview, Ministry of
the Interior, March 10, 2008)
To spur adaptation there were ‘intermediate’ prizes, especially visa liberalisation with a
very strong domestic awareness of importance ascribed to border control by the EU,
reinforced by Macedonia’s geographical position that made it the ‘funnel’ of the so-
called Western Balkan route. Border control was indicative of Macedonia’s effectiveness
as a state and failure was potentially fatal to relations with the EU.
While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration provided the nego-
tiation lead with the EU the Ministry of the Interior was clearly the key actor in the
migration and border security governance network (Figure 4). An interior ministry ofﬁcial
emphasised that ‘The role of the Ministry of the Interior as a main policy-maker of
migration policy is uncontested’ (Interview, March 10, 2008); the Interior Ministry also
coordinated the development of IBM. This is hardly a surprising ﬁnding and is in line
with our ﬁndings in Slovenia and Croatia. The point that we seek to emphasise,
however, is the re-constitution of authority that arose from the re-scaling of policy as a
result of the capacity bargain that has been struck between the Macedonian state and
Figure 4. The migration and border security network: Macedonia. MI, Ministry of the Interior; MFA, Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs; MLSP, Ministry of Labour and Social Policy; University, University of Skopje; IOM;
UNHCR; DelCEC, Commission Delegation; MARRI, Migration, Asylum and Refugees Regional Initiative;
SecEA, Secretariat for European Affairs; EAR, European Agency for Reconstruction; MFin, Ministry of
Finance; ICMPD; DCAF, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF); UNDP;
IBMC, CARDS Border police project/Integrated Border Management Commission; Red Cross, Macedo-
nian Red Cross; UNFPA; OSCE, Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe; ThinkTanks,
Think Tank Network; NGOs.
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the EU. This affects the content of policy and its domestic legitimacy, as well as the inte-
gration of Macedonian ministers and ofﬁcials within transgovernmental networks. The
ruling ideas within Macedonia about migration and border security are European ideas
and were largely uncontested at the elite level. As an Interior Ministry interviewee puts
it: ‘Every adjustment of our legislation is made in accordance with the EU acquis… .
Here the EU inﬂuence is extraordinary… really huge’ (Interview, March 10, 2008).
Again international organisations (e.g. the IOM, ICMPD and UNHCR) are present but,
more than in the other cases, there is a ‘core network’ composed of the ministries of
foreign affairs and interior, and the Secretariat for European Affairs. This helped to
clarify the EU’s role in the policy network. The key organisation was the Ministry of
the Interior, but our interviews demonstrated the EU’s centrality, particularly the Com-
mission as the source of policy development. Enlargement and the perceived sensitivity
of border control promoted network integration. Expertise was drawn from a wide
range of organisations and provided clear evidence of the multi-level re-scaling of
migration and border security. For example, between 2005 and 2007, ﬁnancial support
under the EU CARDS programme was made available to support IBM with involvement
by the French Ministry of the Interior and involvement too from international organis-
ations such as IOM and ICMPD (Taylor, Geddes, and Lees 2012, 158). The effect was
to place considerable stress on domestic actors. Issues of capacity and capability placed
limits on policy transfer:
We cannot copy-paste something, which was successful in Germany in our country and think
that it is successful. We can write hundreds of laws, but what matters most is how we
implement them. Macedonia still has certain speciﬁcs which must be respected and I
think that we are aware that we have taken into consideration these speciﬁcs and implement
them in our everyday work, as well as in laws we adopt. (Interview, Ministry of the Interior,
March 10, 2008)
It could be asked whether the changes to national legislation would have occurred
anyway. The answer to this question is that they may well have done so but the timing
and rapidity of change the product of the EU as the driver of policy development.
Conclusion
This article analysed adaptation in the area of migration and border security in three SEE
countries with varying relationships with the EU. The relational content of transgovern-
mental networks in the three case countries show how governed interdependence changes
and reconstitutes state authority and relations between states, but also strengthens key
domestic actors. SNA demonstrates the composition of transgovernmental networks
that constitute an arena for social learning in conditions of governed interdependence.
Learning had a strong compulsory component but central state actors in all three countries
were willing pupils and the timing and tempo of policy change could not be accounted for
without factoring-in the EU’s role.
That European integration empowers central state actors is not in itself a new ﬁnding.
There is an established body of work that shows co-operation at the EU level strength-
ens national executives. However, what we have sought to do through carefully
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grounded empirical analysis is extend the scope of these analyses, by specifying the rela-
tional and interactional content of networks, moving beyond the state intergovernmen-
tal versus supranational dichotomy and, develop fresh insights using case countries that
have tended to be marginal to the study of migration but that are central to the EU’s
approach to migration and border security. Our focus on the relational aspects of
policy change and state capacity and the ways in which domestic law and policy have
been reconstituted and rescaled shows that, while none of our cases is a major immi-
grant destination country, all were framed as a potential route for irregular migrants
to enter the EU with attendant efforts to enhance capacity to control territorial
access. Each of the countries accepted and participated with this because of the
broader beneﬁts of EU membership.
The analysis also shows the extent of control within policy networks derived from the
inﬂuence of the EU frame on new and prospective member states and the framing’s
impact is reﬂected in (broadly) similar domestic policy networks. These are structured
to achieve common (EU mandated) ends but the domestic networks also engage exten-
sively with international organisations and other EU countries. To seek to capture this
in terms of whether they reﬂect an intergovernmental or a supranational dynamic is
missing the point. Rather, they exemplify the development of transgovernmental
forms of governance of migration and border security that are multi-level and, while
strongly focused on states, have a broad range of participants; they change in fundamen-
tal ways the strategic context and social basis for the making and implementing of
migration policy in Europe.
Note
1. The network diagrams were created using UCINET/Netdraw (http://www.analytictech.com/
ucinet) and we gratefully acknowledge the help and assistance of Dr Daniel Wunderlich in pre-
paring the diagrams. The analyses and the errors are, of course, entirely our own. The nature and
type of relationships is shown by the style of the line connecting different actors. The ties are
represented thus:
1 = occasional business relations/work contacts Dotted line
2 = regular contacts, often conﬁned to individual projects dashed line
3 = permanent and strategic solid line
The following symbols represent the nodes:
Organisation Symbol
Central ministries Box
Para-governmental agencies Square
EU actors Circle in box
NGOs Upward pointing triangle
International organisations Downward pointing triangle
Member state agencies Plus
Non-member state agencies Diamond
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the authors.
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